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Abstract 
This paper proposes a theory for the persistence of income inequality using a simple 
overlapping generations model with two consumption goods and two production sectors. 
There are two classes of workers, high and low skilled, each with a comparative 
advantage in a different type of production. Our model has a parameter range in which' 
workers permanently specialize in the production type associated with their respective 
comparative advantages. This pattern of specialization leads to persistent income 
inequality, between skill classes, that is determined by the structure of demand for the 
two consumption goods. When the model is extended to a multi-sector framework, 
persistent inequality occurs under natural conditions on sector specific productivities. 
Finally this paper analyzes several egalitarian policies. 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the new implication for the persistence 
of income inequality through human capital accumulation. A considerable literature 
has explained the occurrences of persistent inequality by the result from the difference 
of investment activities for human capital between rich and poor individuals in 
long-term equilibrium. On the other hand, we propose an alternative model in which all 
individuals have a same marginal propensity of human capital investment. In our 
model, there are two kinds of consumption goods and two classes of workers 
distinguished by amount of human capital. Individuals specialize in the production type 
associated with their respective comparative advantages. We prove that a natural 
pattern of such specialization leads to the gap of the amount of human capital in 
long-term although all workers make a same investment to human capital of their 
children. 
In seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that inequality in the distribution of 
income persistence in the long run under credit market imperfections and indivisible 
investment technology. The indivisibility requires an amount of funds for investment to 
human capital. Since the financial market is imperfect, only relative rich individuals 
can invest for the technology while poor ones cannot. The difference of the investment 
activities leads to persistent income me quality. A number of studies, including Banerjee 
and Newman (1993), Freeman (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), Ghatak 
and Jiang (2002), Mookhejee and Ray (2002,2003), and Sakuragawa and Mitsui (2002), 
also conclude that fin,ancial market imperfections and indivisible technology imply an 
absence of opportunities for poor individuals to access high earning investment 
technologies. 
Another stream of research on persistent inequality is based on the segregation or 
segmentation of society as descried by Benabou (1994, 1996) and Durlauf (1996). 
Wealthy families have an incentive to isolate themselves from the rest of society in 
order to maintain a high level of education for their children. The gap in education 
levels and a positive externality between social classes leads to persistent inequality in 
Income. 
Chakraborty and Das (2005) and Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) show that 
the gap in private health investment between the rich and poor is a cause of persistent 
inequality. In their model, individuals can extend their life expectancy by investment 
for own health. But, less wealthy individuals are unable to afford to care their health; 
the life expectancy is short. Thus, poor individuals have little incentive to invest their 
human capital. Hence, the difference for investment in education and health care 
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between wealthy and less wealthy individuals leads to persistent inequality. 
De la Crolix and Doepke (2003) and Moav (2005) present a model in which fertility 
and education decisions are interdependent. Families with less human capital decide to 
have more children and invest less education. The difference of the investment for 
human capital yields a large income inequality in the next generation. 
Mani (2001) and Das (2007) explore another source of persistent income inequality on 
the demand side; non-homothetic (hierarchic) preferences lead to persistent income 
inequality. Mani (2001) presents a model in which there are a basic good and two kinds 
of luxury (medium and high skilled) goods. Because productions of these goods vary in 
skill requirements, workers must make an amount of invest for human capital in order 
to produce luxury goods. When income inequality is high, the low and medium skilled 
classes face low demand for their products. Because the relative price of their products 
is low, this implies low returns to human capital investment for medium skilled labor; 
they do not afford higher education for their children. 
Above literature provides persuasive explanations for the mechanisms that lead to 
persistent inequality in various economies and societies; the indivisibility of investment 
technology, the segmented society, the gap on health care, the difference of fertility, or 
hierarchic preference yield the difference of investment for human capital and, in result, 
perpetuating income inequality. In contrast, we present a model in which every 
individual has a same marginal propensity of human capital investment (education for 
children) by assuming homothetic preference. Moreover, the education technology is 
dividable, and labor and goods markets are perfect competitive. We present a difference 
mechanism which leads to persistent inequality from the production technologies with 
different elasticities of output to human capital, competitively job selection, and the 
adjustment of goods price and wage. 
Our model is developed from Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) by introducing the 
construction of the classical Ricardian framework. Our overlapping generations model 
has two kinds of consumption goods and two production sectors. Technologies in each 
sector differ in the elasticity of output to human capitaL There are two types of workers 
who are classified as high skilled and low skilled according to their endowments of 
human capitaL While high skilled workers have an absolute advantage in both types of 
production, each type of worker has a comparative advantage in a different type of 
production. Hence, similar to the Ricardian model of international trade, three kinds of 
market equilibria are possible: a complete specialization case and two incomplete 
specialization cases. Since production technologies differ between sectors, the human 
capital accumulation functions vary across the household dynasties of each skill class. 
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As such the speed of human capital accumulation depends on the pattern of 
specialization. Thus, the transition of the gap between human capital endowments 
leads to changes in the pattern of specialization. 
We show that this model leads to an equilibrium with persistent income inequality 
when complete specialization occurs in the steady state. High skilled workers have a 
comparative advantage in the more productive sector, and thus high skilled dynasties 
accumulate human capital at a greater rate than low skilled dynasties. This difference 
in accumulation rates leads to an increase in income inequality. In contrast, the rapid 
human capital accumulation of high skilled workers improves the productivity of the 
good in which they have a comparative advantage thereby increasing production and 
supply and reducing the price for this good. Because wage equals the market value of 
workers' marginal production in perfectly competitive markets, the human capital 
accumulation of high skilled workers reduces the high skilled wage. This effect softens 
income inequality. As a result, these two effects decide the intensity of income inequality, 
and persistent inequality occurs in the economy. 
Economies in the real world have many kinds of goods and production sectors. We 
extend the two sector model to multi"sector framework and show that a perfectly 
competitive economy naturally leads to persistent inequality under natural parameter 
conditions on sector specific productivities. In not only the two sector model but also in 
the multi"sector model, the degree of income inequality is determined by the relative 
market sizes for the consumption goods, but is independent of prod uctivi ties parameters. 
However, an increase in productivity leads to the expansion of income inequality in long 
run. 
Finally, we consider three policies which have equalization effects. An income 
redistribution policy, which is a combination of a proportional income tax and an income 
transfer, changes the transition function of human capital inequality. We show that 
even if the income redistribution is very small, this policy prevents income inequality 
from exploding. Moreover, we consider two other policies: a purchase of goods by 
government and commodity taxes. We show that these have egalitarian effects through 
the demand"side of the good markets. These effects have over-looked in one sector 
models. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic 
set"up of the economy. Subsection 3.1 considers short"run equilibrium and the 
relationship between the human capital gap and income inequality. Subsection 3.2 
shows long"run equilibrium and the existence of a parameter range that leads to 
persistent income inequality. In section 4, we consider egalitarian policies. Subsections 
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4.1 and 4.2 respectively show that purchases of goods by government and changes in the 
commodity tax rate have equalization effects. Section 5 provides the conclusions of this 
paper. 
2. The Model 
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals live for two 
periods, young and old. Time is denoted as t = 0,1,2,···. Each individual has a single 
child. While individuals have identical preferences, they are classified into two types, 
low skilled (n and high skilled (h), based on their endowments of human capital at 
period t = O. An individual's stock of human capital in period t is denoted as z; 
(i = l,h) with the assumption that z~ < z~. The economy is populated by a unitary 
mass of individuals, and the low and high skilled population shares are Land H, 
respectively, i.e., L + H = 1. This economy produces two goods, X and Y, in sectors X 
and Y, respectively. Imagine that good Xis basic goods like food, while good Yis more 
sophisticated items like books or computers. We set good X as the model numeraire and 
denote the price of good Yas ~. All workers are employed in one of the production 
sectors and supply their labor (human capital) inelastically. Firms enter freely into each 
sector; both the product and labor markets are perfectly competitive. 
,~ 
2.1 Technologies and the comparative advantage 
In the X and Y sectors, goods are produced using only labor (human capital). The 
difference in human capital endowments for type 1 and h workers is not qualitative, but 
rather only reflects the amount of human capital. Both 1 and h type individuals can 
potentially work in either sector X or sector Y. The outputs of a worker with a human 
capital endowment of z and employed in sector X or sector Yare respectively given by 
the following technologies: XI = Ix (z:) and YI = Iy (z:), i = l,h.1 We assume that 
1 Because we consider the Ricardian framework, the production function for good X is 
a linear technology with respect to the number of employed workers. If employed 
number of type 1 and type h in sector X are respectively n: and n;, the total amount of 
good X produced is X = Ix (z:). n: + Ix (z;)· nIh. Thus, the labor required type i for 
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(1) 
where a, h, A, and B are positive constants. a and b represent the elasticitie~ of 
output to human capital and we assume that the elasticity in sector Yis greater than in 
sector X 2 We permit not only 0 < a < b < 1 but also 0 < a < 1 < band 1 < a < b . 
When z; < z: holds, from (1) we have the following inequality: 
Ix (z:) < Ix (z;) 
Iy (z: ) Iy (z;) . 
(2) 
From the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, this inequality implies that a 
type 1 (resp. h) worker has a comparative advantage in the production of good X(resp. J1 
while a high skilled worker has an absolute advantage in both goods. Because of the 
perfectly competitive nature of product markets, three kinds of market equilibrium are 
possible, depending on the relative price of good Y to good .x (i) ~ = Ix (z~) < Ix (z{) , 
Iy (z, ) Iy (z,) 
.. f (Zh) f (Zl) ... f (Zh) f (Zl) . . 
. (n) x ~ < ~ < x ; ,and (m) x ~ < x ; = ~ . The first case ImplIes that 
ly(Zt) Iy(zt) . Iy(zt) Iy(z,) 
low skilled workers specialize completely in the production of good X and high skilled 
workers engage in the production of both goods. In the second case type 1 (resp. type h) 
workers specialize completely in producing good X(resp. good J1. In the third case all 
type h workers specialize completely in the production of good Yand type lworkers turn 
out both goods. We refer to these market equilibria respectively as regimes (i), (i]), and 
(i1]). In regime (ii), each type oflabor specializes completely according to its comparative 
advantage. On the other hand, incomplete specialization occurs in regimes (i) and (iii). 
We define the number of type h workers who are employed in sector X in regime (i) as 
m:'x E (0, H) . Similarly, the number oftype lworkers who are employed in the sector Y 
in regime (iii) is denoted as m? E (O,L). 
2.2 Preferences, education, and demands for each good 
production of one unit of good J; j = X, Y , is 
I/z:) 
1 
2 This assumption reflects that the higher human capitals of workers in the production 
of books, the greater outputs rather than foods. 
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Next, we consider the lifespan of households. In the young period, each individual 
obtains human capital through education, and all tuition fees are covered by funds from 
the individual's parents. For simplicity, we assume that individuals take no economic 
decisions in young periods. Only in their old periods, individuals decide their economic 
activity; they obtain employment with a firm in either sector X or sector Y. The income 
derived from this employment is used to consume goods X and Yand to bring up the 
child. 
We assume that the bringing up a child with health bodies and minds reqUires 
sufficient nutrition and education in childhood.3 We do not consider the borrowing and 
lending for education funds. Developing the framework of Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1992), the human capital of the t+ 1 generation, z:+!' is formed according to the 
following function; 
i -O( i )fl( i )!-fl( i)Y Zt+! - ex,t ey,t Zt' (3) 
where 0 IS a positive constant and P,y E (0,1). e~,t and e~,t are consumptions of 
goods X and Yin childhood and their parents buy them for the child. z: captures the 
positive externality from the parent's human capital. 
Individuals obtain the utility from the consumptions III the old period and the 
altruism for their children. All individuals have the identical preference as follows: 
C y,t are, respectively, consumptions of good X and Yin the old period. The third term 
captures the parents' utility which they feel from their children grows. Substituting (3) 
into this preference, we have 
U = 5logcx,t + 7J logcy,t + o-jJlogex,t + 0-(1- jJ) log ey,t + oylogzt + logO. (4) 
Individuals supply their human capital inelastically in the old period, and all workers 
with the same stock of human capital earn the same wage, denoted by w: = w(Z;) , due 
to the competitive nature of the labor market. Since individuals manage for 
3 Most of studies, including Glomm and Ravikumar, assume one kind of consumption 
good. In contrast, our model has two kinds of goods, so we assume equation (3). 
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consumptions of themselves in the old period and their children, the budget constraint 
IS 
(5) 
(4) and (5) yield each demand function as follows; 
i 5:..'; 17W: fJwi d· 0"(1- P)w: 
Cx,t = UWt , Cy,t = ----p;- ex,t = a: t' an ey,t = ~ (6) 
Because the populations of type 1 and type h workers are respectively Land H, the 
national income in period t is It = L . w: + H . wth , the total demands for good X and Y 
are 
3. Market Equilibrium 
3.1 Short-run equilibrium 
We begin our analysis by focusing on only one period (we omit the time subscript tin 
this section). From (7), the market equilibrium conditions for good X and good Yin 
regimes (i), (ii) and (iii) are, respectively, 
{
Co + O"P)I = Ix (Zl). L + IX(Zh). mh,x 
(7J+O";~i~P))I =ly(zh).(H-mh,x) ' (8) 
{
Co +O"P)I = Ix(ZI).L 
(7J+O"(1-P))I = I' ( h).H' (9) 
p(ii) J y z 
{
CO +O"P)I = Ix (Zl). (L _m''y) 
(o+O"(1-P))I = I' (I). I,Y I' ( h).H' (10) 
p(Ui) J Y Z m + J Y z 
where the superscript on the price of good Y denotes the type of regime. 
As both the product and labor markets are perfectly competitive, firms' profits must 
be zero in every sector in accordance with the free entry condition. In regime (i) there 
are three kinds of firms: firms in sector Xthat employ workers oftype 1, firms in sector 
Xthat employ workers of type h, and firms in sector Ythat employ workers of type h. 
The profits of these firms are, respectively, 7r x = Ix (Zl) - w:,(i) = 0 
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skilled workers must receive the same wage as they are employed in both sectors. 
Therefore, the wage rates in regime (i) are 
{
w,,(i) = Ix(z') 
Wh,(i) = Ix (Zh) = p(i) . Iy (Zh) . 
In the same manner, the wage rates in regimes (ii) and (iii) are, respectively, 
{
w,,(ii) = Ix(z') 
Wh,(ii) = p(ii) . Iy (Zh)' 
{
wl,(iii) = Ix (z') = p(iii) . Iy (Zl) . 




These equations imply that workers' wages must equal the values oftheir products. The 
second equation of (11) and the first equation of (13), combi~ed with (1), respectively 
determine the relative price of good Yin regimes (i) and (iii): 
p(i) = IX(Zh) = A (Zht-b p(iii) = Ix (z') = A (z't-b • 
ly(Zh) B ' Iy(zl) B 
Because z' < Zh and a < b, we have p(i) < p(iii) . Moreover, (9) combined with (1) 
yields 
p(ii) = <I> A(z't with <I> = 17 + cr(1- {3) L . 
B(Zh)b ' 0 +cr{3 H (15) 
Note that, because of 0 + 17 + cr = 1 and L + H = 1 , a small {3 and 17 implies a large 
demand for good Y compared with the demand for good X And a small H implies a 
small supply of good Yin regime (ii). Thus, <I> represents the relative scarcity of good 
Y. Throughout this paper, we assume that <I> > 1. Furthermore, we define the human 





Using A, (8) and (14) yield m:'x = (0 + cr{3)H - (17 + cr~a- fJ))L and (10) and (14) yield 
m? = (17 + cr(l- {3))L - (0 + crfJ)HAb • 
Figure 1 illustrates the supply function for good Y. If this supply function intersects 
the demand function (7) for good Y within the range of the lower horizontal line, regime 
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G) holds. The vertical line corresponds to regime GO and the upper horizontal line 
represents regime (iii). The following proposition claims that the regime is determined 
by the relationship between the human capital ratio and the relative scarcity of good Y. 
Proposition 1 
-I rl -I b-I If <1>a < A , regime (i) holds. If <1> ~ X~ <1>a ,regime (i0 holds. If A < <1> ,regime 
(iii) holds. That is, AU) > A(ii) > A(iii) holds. 
Proof See appendix 1. 
The type of regime that occurs in market equilibrium depends on the relationship 
between the relative productivity of each sector and the relative expenditure on each 
good. Proposition 1 states that regime (0 (resp. regime (iii» tends to hold when the 
demand for good X (resp. }) is large, the population share of type h (resp. type 1) 
workers is large, and/or the economy has a large (resp. small) human capital gap 
between type 1 and h workers; these conditions lead to a low relative price for good Y 
and regime (i) occurs. 
Next we compare the degree of income inequality among regimes. (11)-(15) and (1) 
yield the equilibriuJU wage rates for each regime as follows: 
{
Wl,(i) =A'(Zlt {~/,(ii) =A·(zlt {Wl,(iii) =A.(zlt 
wh,(i) =A·(zht' Wh,(ii) = <1>A·(z l t ' Wh,(iii) =AAb(Zlt' (17) 
We define a measure of income inequality by considering the ratio of wage income for 
type hand lworkers: A == w«) . From (17) and proposition 1, we have 
w(z) 
-I if <1>a < A 
if <1>b-1 < A < <1>a-1 (18) 
if A < <1>r l 
Now we compare the intensity of income inequality· between each regime. Since regime 
(i) (resp. regime (iii» is valid when <1> a-I <A(i) (resp. A(iii) < <1>b-I ), we have 
(A(iii»)b < <1> < (A(i)t although a < b . From (18), we have the magnitude correlation of 
A in each regime. 
Proposition 2 
A(i) > A(ii) > A(iii) . 
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Proposition 2 indicates the order of the intensity of inequality, Because regime (ii) is the 
complete specialization case, national income is allocated to each class of workers 
according to the expenditure ratio for each good, From (7), the low skilled class receives 
(5 + O'fJ)1 (5 + O'a)1 as their wages and then per capita income is , As same way, per 
L 
" £ h' h k'll d k ' (17 + 0'(1- fJ))1 Th h' , I' capIta mcome or Ig s 1 e wor ers IS , us, t e mcome mequa Ity 
H . 
is <D, In regime (i), because some high skilled workers engage in the production of good 
X, the share of national income earned by high skilled workers is greater in regime (i) 
than in reiime (ii), 
'3,2, Long-run equilibrium 
In this subsection, we analyze the transition of human capital and income inequality, 
As the education expenditure for children is funded from their parents' income and the 
wage distribution is affected by each skilled worker's endowment of human capital, the 
parent generation's level of human capital influences the human capital accumulation 
of their children, Substituting (6) and (15) into (3), we have the following equations for 
the transitions of human capital in regimes (i)-(iii): 
{
Z:+I(i) = OO'fJP(1- fJ)I-P AP B1-P (z;)(l-PlCb-a\z;t+r 
Z;+/i) = OO'fJP (1- fJ)I-P AP B1-P (z; t+(l-PXb-o)+r ' 
{
Z:+I (ii) = OO'fJ a (1- fJ)l-p AP B1-P<D-(I-P) (z; )(I-P)b (z: t P+r 
Z;+I (ii) = OO'fJP (1- fJ)I-P AP B1-P<DP (z; ) (l-P)b (z:tP , 
{
Z:+I (iii) = OO'fJP (1- fJ)I-P AP B1-P (z: t+(I-P)(b-a)+r , 
ZI:1 (iii) = OO'fJP (1- fJ)I-P AP B1-/3 (z; )b+r (Z:)(o-b)/3 
(20) 
(21) 
Proposition 1 provides the ranges of parameters for each regime, Hence, (17)-(19) can be 
rewritten using A. as follows: 
-I if <Do < At 
if <Db-I ~ At ~ <D 0 - 1 , 
if A < <D b- I 
I 
(23) 
The dynamic behavior of (23) is classified into three cases according to the parameter 
ranges: a + r < b + r < 1, a + r < 1 < b + r ,and 1 < a + r < b + r , which are, respectively, 
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" 
described by figures 2, 3, and 4.4 In the case of a + r < b + r < 1, figure 2 shows that 
even ifthe economy starts from regime (i) or (ii), it moves to regime (iii) within a finite 
number of periods and the human capital gap At converges to one. In the case of 
a + r < 1 < b + r , figure 3 illustrates that regime (ii) occurs regardless of the regime in 
o 
the first period. In this case, At converges to <1>1-0 > 1; the human capital gap remains 
in the steady state. In the case of 1 < a + r < b + r, figure 4 shows that the economy 
moves to regime (i) within a finite number of periods even if the economy was in regime 
(ii) or (iii) in the first period. The results indicated by these figures are summarized as 
proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 
If a + r < b + r < 1, At convergences to one. If a + r < 1 < b + r , At convergences to 
o 
<1>1-0" > 1. If 1 < a + r < b + r, At increases over time. 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) show that the shape of the accumulation function for 
human capital determines the transition of the human capital gap (and income 
inequality) in a one sector model; i.e., income inequality converges to one if the 
accumulation function is concave, and diverges if the accumulation function is convex. 
In contrast, if a + r < 1 < b + r in our model, the dynamic behavior of our model is 
completely different from that of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). Suppose the economy 
is in regime (iiD, in which the transition of A is convex and type 1 works for both 
sectors. According to . (22) the speed of human capital accumulation for high skilled 
dynasties is faster than that for low skilled dynasties, and the human capital gap and 
income inequality expand. In this case, since the productivity of high skilled workers 
increases rapidly, the employment oflow skilled workers in sector Ycontinues to decline 
over time. Hence, the economy moves into regime (ii) within a finite number of periods. 
In this regime, the human capital endowment of type h workers grows faster than that 
of type 1 workers. The improvement in the productivity of sector Y leads to a large 
increase in the output of good Y. But, since the demand for good Y does not grow at the 
same speed as the production of good Y, the price of good Y decreases by (14). Therefore, 
the human capital of high skilled workers no longer grows explosively; A converges to a 
4 Figures 2-4 do not consider the cases where parameter values are determined by 
a + r = 1 and b + r = 1. 
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constant values of <D 1- r . In this result, the adjustment of the relative price between 
good X and Y, which is not observed in one sector models, leads to the stability of the 
economy.5 
Next, we focus on income inequality AI. (23) and proposition 3 directly yield the 
following corollary. 
Corollary 1 
If ao + a- < bo + a- < 1, AI convergences to one. If a + r < 1 < b + r, AI equals <D 
after the period when the economy moves to regime (ii). If 1 < a + r < b + r, AI 
increases over time. 
In one sector models with single kind of good, the value of human capital coincides with 
wage income. In our two sector model, in contrast, the human capital gap does not 
necessary correspond to income inequality. In particular, ifthe economy is in regime (ii), 
income inequality is independent of the gap of human capital and it is determined by 
the relative scarcity of good Y. 
4. Egalitarian Policies 
4.1 Purchase of goods by government 
In this subsection, we show that government purchases of the low skill intensive good 
reduces income inequality. We assume that government purchases are financed by a 
proportional income tax as in the previous subsection. The government's budget is given 
by r JI = G/ + ~G: ' where GIX and G: are, respectively, the amounts of goods 
purchased by the government. We set the expenditure ratio between good X and good Y 
GX 
as 17 == __ I -y • Thus, the demands from the government for each good are 
~GI 
5 Here we prove that human capitals z; do not diverge in regime (ii). a + r < 1 < b + r 
h 1 
yields A = ~ = <D 1- r in steady state. Substituting it into (21), we have 
z' 
( l+a-r) 
Z:+l = Ba-a a pfJ Aa BfJ<D
a 
I-r (z:ta+bfJ+r . a+ r < 1 implies aa+bfJ + r < 1. 
Therefore, Zh does not explode. 
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Gx 17 I GY __ 1_ £ I =--rw t' I - rw· 1+17 1+17 ~ 
Therefore, the total demands from households and the government are 
-D - -D - I X =a·I Y =fJ·_I 




17 - 1 -
where a ==(1-rw)(a+y)+--rw and f3 ==(l-rw)f3+--rw. a and f3 imply 
1+17 .1 1+17 
the sums of expenditure shares from household and the. government. Note that 
- 8a 8fJ - a L 
a + f3 = 1, - > 0, and - < o. Moreover, we set <D == -=- and then we have 
, 817 817 fJ H 
8<l> < o. The total supply is same as in figure 1. Therefore, proposition 1 yields the 
8ry 
- -I 
ranges for each regime, i.e., regime (i) holds if <D a < A, regime (ii) holds if 
<l>b-I :::;; A :::;; <Da-I , and regime (iii) holds if ,,1,< <Db-I . From ~~ < 0, increasing 17 





) = (l_l..)<Da-I-b-I-1 8<D < 0, increasing 17 reduces the range of regime (n). 
817 a b 817 




AI = <Db' 
AI ' 
- -I if <D a < AI 
if <D b-I < AI < <D a-I . 
if A < <Drl I 
(35) 
Thus, an increase in government purchases of good X only correct income inequality in 
regime (ii). 
From (17)-(19), the transition of the human capital gap is similar to (20) with the 
exception of the ranges for each regime, i.e., 
{
(AI Y8+0" , 
-8 0" 
,,1,1+1 = <D . (AI) , 
(AI)bO+O" , 
(36) 
Figure 6 illustrates (36) and the effect of increasing 17 when ac5 + (j < 1 < bc5 + (j 
holds. Persistent inequality occurs in regime (n) alone. Therefore, the purchase of good 
Xby the government corrects the degree of persistent income inequality. 




If the government increases its purchases of good X; regime (i) expands and regimes (i0 
and (iii) contract. If the economy is regime (ii), the policy reduces income inequality. 
Government purchases of goods influence the demands for goods although this policy 
does not affect the supply-side of the economy. In regimes (0 and (iii), production 
technologies and human capital endowments, which are decided in the previous period, 
determine the prices of goods as (13). In other words, when incomplete specialization 
occurs, the supply side determines the income inequality as (16). Thus, government 
purchases have no effect on wages and the degree of inequality. In contrast, in the case 
of complete specialization, the total demand for each good determines the relative price 
of goods and income inequality. Therefore, government purchases affect the degree of 
income inequality through a change of the relative prices of goods. In other words, if the 
government purchases good X; in which low skilled labor has a comparative advantage, 
the increase in good Xs price raises the value of low skilled labor. Because this 
egalitarian effect comes from a change in the relative price, it does not appear in one 
sector models. 
Government expenditure is usually directed towards public works; this government 
activity should affect relative prices. For example, the main part of government 
expenditure designed to stimulate the economy is usual public construction. Therefore, 
proposition 8 implies that if the technology of construction industry is low skilled labor 
intensive, the fiscal policy has an egalitarian effect. 
4.2 Commodity taxes ' 
In this subsection, we consider government imposed commodity taxes and define the 
tax rates on good X and good Y, respectively, as r x and r y . Assume that the 
government requires a financial resource G and spends the tax revenue.6 The budget of 
the government is 
G =rx . (Xl +El)+ry~~. (37) 
The prices of each good that households face are, respectively, (l + r x) and (l + r y )~ . 
6 Suppose that the financial resource is, for example, a transfer for a foreign country. 
As we examined in subsections 5.1 and 5.2, both a transfer policy for households and 
government purchases work as egalitarian policies. In order to focus on the effect of 
commodity taxes, we assume that the government's financial revenue from the 
commodity taxes disappears from our model. 
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Thus, from (3) and (4), the total demands for good X, good Y, and total expenditure for 
education are, respectively, 
XtD=_a_ 1t , r;D=~~, EtD=-Y- 1t . 
l+rx l+ry ~ l+rx 
(38) 
The supplies of both goods are same as in subsection 3.1. We define a> _ 1 + r x ~~ 
- l+ry a+y H· 
By replacing <l> with <l> in subsection 3.1, we have a characterization ofthe short·run 
equilibrium. From a comparison of a> with <l> in subsection 5.2, we find that 
decreasing r x and the increasing r y has an effect that is identical to an increase in 
r;. Therefore, from proposition 8, we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 2 
If the government decreases the tax rate of good X and increases the tax rate of good Y, 
regime (i) expands and regimes (ii) and (iii) contract. If the economy is in regime (ii), the 
policy reduces income inequality. 
Because commodity taxes change the relative price of goods, a reduction of the tax 
rate for good X has an egalitarian effect by the same mechanism as government 
purchases of good X Under the value added tax (VAT) in the EU, several goods are 
non-taxable. For example, most foods are non-taxable because they are regarded as 
necessities. Thus, VAT is usually considered to benefit low income households because 
they have a' high Engel's coefficient. In contrast, our model has homothetic preferences; 
the Engel's coefficient is constant. However, corollary 3 claims that if the production of 
food is low skill intensive, decreasing the tax rate on food raises the wages of low skilled 
workers. Therefore; we conclude that VAT corrects income inequality through a change 
in the relative price on good markets. 
5. Conclusions 
In a simple model with two consumption goods, two production sectors, and two skill 
classes, we have studied persistent income inequality that stems from comparative 
advantages for the skill classes in the labor market. Our model has three possible 
market regimes. In the complete specialization case, the relative expenditure shares of 
the consumption goods determine the income shares of each skill. Furthermore, the 
relative population shares for each skill class also affect their respective income shares. 
Therefore, education expenditure and then the transition of human capital 
16 
accumulation differ across skill classes. The accumulation function of human capital 
differs from regime to regime. If the accumulation function is concave in one regime and 
convex in the other regimes, the economy moves into the complete specialization regime. 
In this case, rapid growth of high skilled human capital pushes down the price of the 
good that is high skill intensive, the human capital gap and income inequality converge 
to constants, rather than exploding. As a result, persistent income inequality occurs in 
the economy. 
The main point of persist inequality is that a large human capital gap does not 
necessarily correspond with a large income gap. Even when some workers have large 
human capital endowments and produce the good in which they have a comparative 
advantage, their large output is supplied to the market, and through competition the 
price of the good decreases. This price effect reduces income inequality and has been 
over looked in one sector models. We conclude that complete specialization and the price 
mechanism lead to persistent income inequality. 
We have extended the two sector model to the multi· sector framework. An economy 
with both high and low productivity sectors leads to complete specialization and then 
persistent inequality. This is a natural description of the real world. By analogical 
inference from our result, persistent inequality is universal even when markets are 
perfectly competitive and there are no frictions or no regulations. Moreover, we have 
concluded that an expansion of productivity leads to persistent inequality. 
Our model does not have any distortions or frictions with transactions; the labor and 
product markets are both perfectly competitive, and workers chose their jobs freely 
based on their comparative advantages: However, natural parameter conditions for 
sector specific productivity in the multi· sector model lead to persistent inequality. High 
skilled workers have a comparative advantage in highly productive industries. Thus, 
job selection the human capital accumulation of children and income inequality is 
perpetual. 
If inequality expands significantly, it is possible that the government may adopt some 
policy to promote income equalization: We have studied three egalitarian policies. An 
income redistribution policy through a .combination of proportional income taxes and 
transfers has two equalization effects: a direct transfer of income in the short run and 
human capital accumulation in long run. However, because persistent inequality 
implies complete specialization, income inequality is determined only from the 
structure of the goods market and the population ratio between skill classes. Therefore, 
in a completely specialized economy, this policy only has a direct income transfer effect 
in one period. 
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Finally, we have shown that government purchases and commodity taxes have 
egalitarian effects through the demand-side of the good markets. In a completely 
specialized economy, if the government buys the low skill intensive good directly, the 
policy raises the low skilled wage. A reduction of the commodity tax on the low skill 
intensive good has the same effect for income equalization. These effects have been 
over-looked in one sector models. 
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition l. 
The intersection of the demand curve (5) with the vertical supply curve Y= H . fy (Zh) 
. . b () P n-. A·(z't S· h d d' . d . IS gIVen y 14 as = '-V • h b' mce t e eman curve IS a monotonIc ecreasmg 
B·(z ) 
function, we can find which regime holds by investigating the location of the 
intersection of the demand curve with the vertical line. We have that regime (ii) is valid 
'f p(i) P n-. A·(z't <p(iii) Th h 'h f ' (') 1 :::; = '-V' h b - • us, we ave tree ranges 0 parameters: regIme 1 
B·(z ) 
holds if <D. A· (Zl t < p(i) = A (Zh t-b from (13), regime (iD holds if 
B'(Zh)b B 
P(i)=A(Zht-b:::;<D.A.(z't :::;p(iii) = A (z't-b from (14), regime (iii) holds if 
B B'(Zh)b B 
p(iii) = A (Zl t-b < <D. A· (z' t from (13). Rewriting these inequalities, we have 
B B'(Zh)b 
proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
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Figure 3: The transition of ILt in the case of ao + a < 1 < bo + a 
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Figure 4: The transition of A/ in the case of 1 < aJ + (Y < bJ + (Y 
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Figure 5: The effect of an increase in 1] 
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